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Belgium is on the move again. After having submitted a request to the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for an opinion on the compatibility of the
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with EU law in 2017, on
3 December 2020 Belgium announced that it submitted a request for an opinion on
the compatibility of the EU draft for a modernized Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) with
EU law. The focus of the request is on the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
mechanism and its application to intra-EU disputes, i.e. involving an EU member
state on the one hand and an investor from another EU member state on the other
hand. While the Belgian request concerns the modernized EU draft of the ECT, the
findings of the CJEU will have major implications for the current ECT as the ISIDS-
provisions have only slightly changed.
The ECT is a multilateral treaty, which entered into force in 1998 and promotes and
protects investments in the energy sector, inter alia through ISDS. It has more than
50 state parties, including all EU member states (except Italy which withdrew from
the treaty in 2016) and the EU itself. Currently, the EU is negotiating a modernization
of the ECT to bring it into line with the new approaches followed in other investment
agreements. These negotiations have not touched upon the problem of intra-
EU application of the ECT. Intra-EU disputes account for about 60 per cent of all
arbitration proceedings commenced under the ECT, with Spain being the main
target.
Taking the conclusion of the Achmea judgment, where the CJEU held that a Dutch-
Slovak bilateral investment treaty (BIT) was contrary to EU law, at face value, it shall
be discussed whether the CJEU will find the (modernized) ISDS mechanism under
the ECT to be compatible with EU law or not.
The Achmea reasoning
In Achmea the CJEU did not resort to an international law analysis on whether the
BIT in question conformed to EU treaties, but only assessed the BIT in accordance
with the principles of EU law. This approach follows the presumption that EU law
is a legal order different from both domestic law and international law (see already
van Gend en Loos; Costa v ENEL), and operates independently from the domestic
law of member states and international law (so-called autonomy of EU law). In case
of a conflict with international or domestic law, EU law takes precedence. In order
to ensure autonomy of EU law, the CJEU inter alia requires that it remains the final
arbiter of EU law, i.e. it has the monopoly on the authoritative interpretation of EU
law, and courts or tribunal may or must refer questions on interpretations of EU law
to the CJEU in case of doubt about the proper interpretation.
- 1 -
Autonomy was the central problem in Achmea. The applicable law clause of the
Dutch-Slovak BIT, inter alia, referred to ‘the law in force of the Contracting Party
concerned’ (i.e. domestic law) and ‘relevant agreements in force between the
parties’. According to the CJEU, EU law ‘must be regarded both as forming part
of the law in force in every Member State and as deriving from an international
agreement between the Member States’ (Achmea para. 41) and thus, ‘on that
twofold basis’ arbitral tribunals could be required to interpret or apply EU law under
the Dutch-Slovak BIT (Achmea para. 42). However, since arbitral tribunals did not
constitute courts or tribunals of member states, they could not request a preliminary
ruling from the CJEU on questions of EU law (Achmea paras. 43, 49). Therefore,
there existed a threat to the autonomy of EU law and thus, incompatibility of the BIT
with EU law (Achmea paras. 58-60).
Applying Achmea to the ECT
Following the Achmea judgment, the European Commission unequivocally
stated that the reasoning of the CJEU equally applies to the ECT leading to the
inapplicability of the ECT for intra-EU disputes. In 2019, the majority of member
states sided with that position (for an analysis see here).
Various arbitral tribunals have distinguished Achmea from the ECT-disputes,
pointing to the fact that the ECT is a multilateral treaty, the EU itself is party to
ECT, domestic law does not form part of the applicable law and that the CJEU
acknowledged that the EU may join international agreements which include dispute
settlement mechanisms (see e.g. Masdar v. Spain paras. 678-683; ESPF and others
v. Italy paras. 336-338).
However, from an EU law perspective and following the approach in Achmea, these
arguments seem hardly relevant. The ISDS-mechanism in the ECT is essentially
identical to the one in the Dutch-Slovak BIT: ad hoc arbitration and no option for
arbitral tribunals to request preliminary rulings from the CJEU. The modernized
version foresees access to a multilateral investment court as an alternative avenue,
but such a court will also not satisfy the criteria for ‘court or tribunal of a Member
State’ to make requests for preliminary references (cf Achmea para. 48; cf Parfums
Christian Dior paras. 21-23). Even if it were to qualify as ‘court or tribunal of a
Member State’, it is not the only available forum and ad hoc arbitration remains
an option for investors. Thus, the important question is whether the applicable law
clause of the ECT includes EU law, since this would entail the risk that EU law might
be interpreted by an arbitral tribunal or investment court without involvement of the
CJEU.
EU law as applicable law?
Pursuant to Article 26(6) ECT, tribunals decide investment disputes ‘in accordance
with this Treaty and applicable rules and principles of international law’. The
modernized version clarifies in a footnote that ‘the domestic law of a Contracting
Party shall not be part of the applicable law.’ (cf Art 8.31 CETA). While it is arguably
clear in the old and modernized version that EU law as domestic law cannot be part
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of the applicable law, it is less clear whether EU law forms part of the ‘applicable
rules and principles of international law’.
Unlike some pre-Achmea tribunals (see e.g. Electrabel v. Hungary paras.
4.117-4.126), recent decisions by arbitral tribunals have concluded that EU law
did not constitute ‘rules and principles of international law’ (see e.g. Vattenfall v.
Germany para. 133). The tribunal in Eskosol v. Italy provided a detailed analysis
that ’rules and principles of international law’ can only refer to universally applied
custom, general principles of law or other universally applicable rules (paras.
118-120). Accordingly, ‘the phrase “rules and principles in international law” cannot
be interpreted as encompassing EU law, which is a regional and not a worldwide
system of law’ (para. 121). Conversely, the post-Achmea tribunal in InfraRed v.
Spain (para. 258) acknowledged that it must act ‘in conformity with the “applicable
rules and principles of international law”’ holding that ‘EU law is undeniably part of
the body of international law that the Tribunal is also bound to apply.’
Thus, it seems likely that the CJEU will regard the ECT as incompatible with EU
law. In Achmea, it clearly acknowledged that EU law is linked to international law
as it ‘[derives] from an international agreement between member states’ (Achmea
para. 41). On the one hand, the phrase ‘rules and principles of international law’
is arguably not synonymous with ‘relevant agreements in force between the
parties’ (Dutch-Slovak BIT) and the CJEU did not refer to ‘the general principles
of international law’ in the applicable law clause of the Dutch-Slovak BIT when
discussing the nature of EU law. On the other hand, since arbitral tribunals have
been susceptible to the view that EU law was part of the ‘applicable rules and
principles of international law’, the CJEU will be able to clearly identify a real risk to
the autonomy of EU law and find Article 26(6) of the (modernized) ECT incompatible
with EU law.
To some extent, such an outcome has already been foreshadowed. Advocate
General Saugmandsgaard noted in passing in a recent case that the ECT may
be entirely inapplicable to intra-EU disputes because of the findings in Achmea
‘especially in relation to the particular nature of the law established by the Treaties
and the principle of mutual trust between the Member States’.
The beginning of the end?
The recent request of Belgium for a ruling on the compatibility of intra-EU investor-
state arbitration under a future modernized ECT with EU law should settle once and
for all whether intra-EU disputes under the ECT conform with EU law. Most likely, the
CJEU will err on the side of caution and find that the applicable law clause includes
EU law and declare it incompatible on that basis. EU member states will need to
decide whether the modernization of the ECT should be even more ambitious or if
and how the EU should exit the ECT altogether (for an analysis see here). In any
event, while the intra-EU investment arbitration saga might be coming to an end for
the ECT, it is still far from over.
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